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Abstract
Throughout the XXth century arms have not only been tradable goods, but
also foreign policy instruments. This paper focuses on countries supplying ma-
jor conventional weapons (MCW), and investigates whether changes in political
conditions impact the quantity of MCW supplied to third countries. In partic-
ular, I concentrate on democratic exporters and estimate a gravity-type panel
TOBIT for the years 1975-2004. Results suggest that the exporter’s chief exec-
utive being right-wing has a positive and significant impact on MCW exports.
This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to support national industry and
deregulate heavy industry exports. I also find that higher political competition
is associated with higher MCW exports, and that executives serving the last year
of their current term tend to increase MCW exports if they cannot be re-elected,
and to decrease MCW exports if they run for re-election.
Keywords: Arms Trade; Politics; Gravity-type Equation.
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1 Introduction
The trade in arms has important ethic implications, especially when it involves devel-
oping countries: the last 15 years of conflicts have cost Africa a sum that is equivalent
to international aid in the same period, and at least 95% of Africa’s most commonly
used conflict weapons come from outside the continent (IANSA, Oxfam, and Safeworld,
2007). However, even though during the past decades the public concern on arms trade
has increased exponentially, as Hartley and Sandler (1995) point out the topic has not
received equal attention by economists and political science scholars. The economic
papers on arms trade are not very numerous, and most contributions are theoretical
(Peleg, 1977; Levine and Smith, 1995; Levine and Smith, 1997; Levine and Smith,
2000). The few partial-equilibrium empirical papers mostly relate to the demand side
(Pearson, 1989; Kollias and Sirakoulis, 2002; Smith and Tasiran, 2005), with only
two contributions focused on the supply (Blanton, 2000; Brauer, 2000). In this paper
I simultaneously take into account demand and supply side of the arms market to
answer a question that relates to economics and politics: whether the internal politi-
cal conditions in the exporting country influence the amount of arms supplied to third
countries. To answer that, a gravity-type panel TOBIT is estimated for the years 1975-
2004. Gravity equations have been extensively used in economics of trade (Bergstrand,
1985; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Egger, 2000; Glick and Rose, 2002; Anderson and
Wincoop, 2003). In particular I remand to Summary (1989) who investigates whether
international political factors affect US non-arms merchandise exports.
I restrict my attention to major conventional weapons (henceforth MCW), a tech-
nologically advanced share of the arms production sector. MCW include aircrafts,
armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships; it does not include small
arms.1 All along the XXth century the MCW industry has been highly concentrated:
the twenty major MCW producers alone account for 97% of total worldwide exports for
the period 1975-2004. Only five out of these twenty countries have ever experienced an
autocratic regime. The core of my analysis focuses on the democracies, which account
for more than 65% of total MCW exports for the period 1975-2004.
The trade in arms is not just business but also a foreign policy issue involving
1Small arms are excluded because the black share of the market is so big that no reliable transfer
dataset is available. Moreover, the small arms industry is less concentrated and nowadays most
countries, even among developing ones, produce some amounts of them.
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strategic interests (Smith, Humm and Fontanel, 1985; Krause, 1991; Skons, 2000), and
international relations during the Cold War have alimented this perception. The mar-
ket for arms lacks an international regulation, being therefore subject to each country’s
sovereignty. Arms export licenses are exclusively granted by governmental agencies
(mostly inter-ministerial committees) and can be revoked by them.2 Even if nowadays
licenses for certain destinations are automatically granted, in virtually all exporting
countries a relevant share of the arms industry is state property, and arms orders boost
the employment of industrial regions (Martin, Hartley and Stafford, 1999).3 A well-
documented case of public subsidies are the export credits granted by the UK Export
Credit Governmental Department: Martin (1999) concludes that in the UK each job
generated by arms export is subsidized by just under 2000 pounds per annum and that
a one-third reduction in UK defense exports would save the taxpayer 76 million pounds
per annum at 1995 prices. For a detailed overview of the national controls system of
the twenty major MCW exporters see the Appendix B.
Given that arms trade is also a foreign policy issue and that governments control
arms exports through different channels, my aim is to test how internal politics af-
fects arms export decisions. In Section 4 I first provide evidence that MCW exports
of democratic and autocratic regimes differ, and then exclude from the sample major
non-democratic producers to concentrate on the political characteristics of democra-
cies only. In the empirical specification, the dependent variable is the amount of MCW
transferred and the equation is estimated for years 1975-2004, that is, the core of Cold
War and the years right after. The choice of a TOBIT model is consistent with the
nature of data.
The results give original insights into arms trade suggesting that, ceteris paribus,
the government in power being right-wing significantly increases the quantity of MCW
exported. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency to lower trade barriers with
its consequences on exports deregulation, or a greater support toward the national ar-
2Few countries have made their arms licensing regulation more transparent through secondary
legislation, while the vast majority of them leave all details to inter-ministerial committees (defense,
economic, security ministries and parliament are normally represented). Regulated systems are flexible
and subject to varied interpretation and enforcement by the government (see Miller and Brooks, 2001).
3The list of Top 100 arms-producing companies (containing information on sales, profit, employ-
ment and ownership) is provided on line by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI).
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mament sector in terms of subsidies (perhaps through partly/fully government-funded
research) or offset agreements.4 I also find that higher political competition in the
parliament (as expressed by the Herfindahl index for parties’ seats) is associated with
higher MCW exports. Finally, data suggests that MCW trade varies during the elec-
toral campaign, perhaps because of the scrutiny of public opinion: executives serving
the last year of their current term tend to increase MCW exports if they cannot be
re-elected, and to decrease MCW exports if they can run for re-election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is briefly
described, while Section 3 explains data and variables in use. In Section 4 results are
presented, and Section 5 concludes. Tables and figures are presented in the Appendix
A. Appendix B contains an overview of arms national export control systems for the
twenty major exporters.
2 The Model
The panel is unbalanced and evolves along three dimensions: the dependent variable
armsijt is the MCW flow from country i to country j at time t. Since the amount
of arms traded in a given year equals zero for most observations, I depart from the
previous literature using a TOBIT model of the form
armsijt =
{
arms∗ijt if arms
∗
ijt > 0
0 if arms∗ijt ≤ 0
for
arms∗ijt = x
′
ijtβ + γi + δj + φt + uijt (1)
where γi, δj and φt are fixed effects and the covariates x
′
ijt explain both the latent
variable arms∗ijt and the observed outcome. Fixed effects are a safe choice since γi,
δj and φt are likely to be correlated with the regressors. Moreover, they account by
4Offset agreements are very common counter-trade practices in the defense industry where the
supplier (a private company) commits to buy products from the purchasing country. The US Bureau
of Industry and Security defines them as “mandatory compensations required by foreign governments
when purchasing weapon systems and services”.
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construction for time-invariant country characteristics and time trends.
I first consider all twenty major exporters as ranked by the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which alone account for 97% of total MCW
exports for the period 1975-2004.5 These countries -in order of importance- are: the
US, the USSR, the UK, France, Russia, China, West Germany (FRG), Czechoslovakia,
Italy, Unified Germany (GMY), Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Poland, Israel, Spain,
Ukraine, Switzerland, Brazil, Norway. Out of these twenty exporters, later on I ex-
clude the non-democratic ones: the USSR, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland 1975-1988,
and Brazil 1975-1984. The remaining democracies still account for more than 65% of
total MCW exports for the period 1975-2004. On the import side all independent coun-
tries recognized by UN are included as potential importers, subject to data availability.6
A last issue to be discussed is the timing of the trade. Many categories of arms
are grouped under the MCW label and procedures vary from country to country (see
Appendix B), however responses to political changes seem to be relatively fast. Even
if the production of some arms can take up to a few years, licenses are required not for
the negotiation of the contract but for the delivery.7 When licenses to delivery arms
are granted, they expire in a reasonably short time (within one year for France and
Italy). Moreover, licenses can be revoked by the governmental agency under a wide
range of circumstances. For all those reasons I stick to the specification in Equation (1)
where the response is assumed to be immediate (i.e., within the year): if anything, this
is a conservative choice underestimating the size of the overall effect. Specifications
5Even this way the dependent variable is zero in 91% of the observations: if I add more exporters
the data become intractable.
6Importing and exporting countries are classified as in the Correlated of War Project 2005. The
only exception is that I code separately Russia and the USSR (USSR data goes until 1991 included,
and Russia from 1992 onwards). Whenever data are available I have also included potential importers
which have never traded MCW (Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, East Timor, Liechtenstein,
Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Sao Tome e Principe, Santa Lucia, Nauru).
7A license is required to open negotiations in few specific cases, enumerated in what follows. In
Germany an authorization to negotiate is necessary only if intermediaries located in foreign territory
are involved. In Italy, companies must be in the national register of arms exporting companies to
be able to contract for exports of military items. In the US negotiation is free, except if technical
information relevant for national security is revealed in the course of contract. In France licenses are
required both for negotiating and delivering arms; in any case, the two procedures are independently
conducted and both licenses expire within one year, which is a reasonably short time length.
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with the lead dependent variable fit the data considerably worse than the model above
(results available upon requests).
3 Data and Variables Description
This section illustrates the main features of the data and the variables in use. The re-
gressors’ subscripts remind the dimensions of variation (i for exporter, j for importer,
t for time). The time span goes from 1975-2004 to 1980-2004, depending on the speci-
fication.
Data on MCW trade come from the Arms Transfers Database by the SIPRI. MCW
consist in aircrafts, armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships.
SIPRI data register MCW transfers to sovereign countries (as well as international or-
ganizations, rebel groups, factions and non-governmental armed forces, which appear
under a recipients heading different from the country’s central government). In order
to be registered in the SIPRI dataset weapons must be transferred voluntarily by the
supplier and must have a military purpose; time of transfer refers to the moment when
delivery is registered. Units of arms are computed according to a trend indicator value
system which reflects not economic prices but amounts transferred: the weapons are
evaluated for their technical parameters, so that similar weapons have similar scores.8
This feature improves the quality of the information in several ways. First, in many
cases no reliable data on the economic value of a transfer are available. Second, even
if the value of a transfer is known, it is in almost every case the total value of a deal,
which may include not only the weapons themselves but also other related items (e.g.,
spare parts, armament or ammunition, specialized vehicles, software changes to exist-
ing systems, or training). Third, even if the value of a transfer is known, important
details about the financial arrangements of the transfer (e.g., credit/loan conditions
and discounts) are usually not known. On the other side, the SIPRI trend indicator
not only registers arms sales, but also other forms of supply including weapons trans-
ferred as political aid at a zero price. This trend measure is consistent with the focus
8For a number of weapon types it is possible to find the actual average unit acquisition price in
open sources. Those weapons with a real price are used as reference points, and all other weapons
for which a price is not known are assigned a value in an index, reflecting their military resources in
relation to core weapons. For a detailed description of the methodology see Hagelin and Wezeman
(2005).
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of my study: since MCW are also policy instruments, price and market laws would just
tell a part of the story.9 In all specifications that follow, the dependent variable armsijt
is the SIPRI MCW flow from country i to country j at time t (1 unit corresponds to 1
SIPRI point). Only sovereign countries are taken into account, while other entities such
as international organizations and non-governmental armed forces are omitted. The
SIPRI data are also used to build the variable MCW exportsit, which is calculated
as the total MCW flow out of the exporter country at time t and is aimed to capture
industry fluctuations (1 unit corresponds to 1000 SIPRI points).
Data on democracy come from the Polity IV Project by the Center for Global
Policy of George Mason University. I use the composite polity indicator that ranges
from -10 (strongly autocratic regime) to +10 (strong democracy): democracyit is a
dummy equal to one if the exporter’s polity indicator is greater than zero. I adopt this
dichotomous classification for the sake of simplicity, but it does not affect the results
since the distribution is almost bimodal: in 96% of the cases where democracyit equals
zero the polity indicator is equal to or smaller than -4, and similarly for 96% of the
cases where democracyit equals one the polity indicator is equal to or greater than
+6. In some specification I also control for the importer’s democracy scorejt (in the
original scale from -10 to +10). The transition out of Cold War coincided with the
so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991): between 1987 and 1997,
54 countries went through a process of (full or partial) democratization (Papaioannou
and Siourounis, 2008). This is also reflected in the Polity IV data: on the total sample
of 168 countries, the median polity score for period 1975-2004 is 0, while the median
polity score for period 1990-2004 is 5.
Variables reflecting political conditions come from the World Bank Development
Research Group’s Database of Political Institutions, DPI2006 (Beck et. al. 2001).
9The only alternative source of arms trade data is the World Military Expenditure and Arms Trans-
fers (WMEAT) published by the US Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance.
The WMEAT measure also covers small weapons and, unlike the SIPRI index, is an economic value
measure registering arms bundles sold on the commercial market. As Brzoska (1982) points out, the
WMEAT measure has several major problems. First, coverage is worse than in the SIPRI measure.
Second, in the many cases where prices are not available, a cost model estimated for US arms industry
has been applied to other countries including the USSR, which leads to serious biases as the industrial
and employment structure of the two countries are not comparable. Third, the WMEAT measure
underestimates the role of western suppliers other than the US and the USSR. Moreover, WMEAT
data are not based on open sources of information but on statistics from US intelligence service.
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This dataset classifies the chief executives in power as one of the followings, depending
on their economic policy: Right (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing),
Left (communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing), Center (for parties that
are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist, e.g.
party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). I use
two dummies centristit and leftit to account for center and left exporter’s executives,
while the Right dummy is omitted. Just to mention a few examples: all USSR ex-
ecutives are classified as left, while for what regards the US Carter (1977-1981) and
Clinton (1993-2001) are classified as left, Regan (1981-1989), G.H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
and G.W. Bush (2001-2009) as right. For the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher
(1979-1990) is classified as right, while Tony Blair (1998-2007) as left. Italian leaders
belonging to the Christian Democratic party (Democrazia Cristiana) are classified as
centrist for the period 1975-1983 and 1988-1992. In some specification I use the dummy
same orientationijt which equals one if the chief executives in exporter and importer
countries are both left-wing, both centrist, or both right-wing. This is to test whether
arms trade is dictated by friendship and strategic considerations, as documented by
Alesina and Dollar (2000) for international aid. I also include the concentration index
Herfindahlit which is the sum of the squared seats shares of all parties in the ex-
porter’s parliament and measures the relative power of the party in power: an higher
value of the index means lower political competition. Finally, the dummy end termit
equals one if the the exporter’s executive is serving the last year of the current term
and there is no specific rule limiting re-election. On the other side, end last termit
equals one if the exporter’s executive is serving the last year of the current term and it
cannot be (immediately) re-elected. Other time-invariant country characteristics (such
as whether the country has common vs. civil law, or a parliamentary vs. presidential
system) are taken into account by the fixed effect.
Armed conflicts in the importing country may proxy for the MCW demand side.
Data on conflicts come from the Armed Conflict Database provided by the Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP). This dataset provides detailed information on the type and the severity of
conflicts that took place between independent states and/or political factions from 1946
onwards. Conflicts are classified in three categories: interstate armed conflict (which
occurs between two or more states), internal armed conflict (which occurs between the
government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention
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from other states) and internationalized internal armed conflict (which occurs between
the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups with interven-
tion from other states).10 In my specifications, I include three dummies conflict Ajt,
conflict Bjt and conflict Cjt which equal one if there is an interstate, internal or
internationalized internal conflict in act between the importing country and a third
part respectively. When a country has two or more conflicts in the same year, I take
the most severe one, according to the following decreasing order of severity: interstate,
internationalized internal, internal.
Data for per capita GDP and population, which proxy for countries’ supply and
demand potentials, come from the Penn World Table Version 6.2 (2007) provided by
the Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the
University of Pennsylvania. The variables pgdpit and pgdpjt refer to the countries’ per
capita GDP (expressed in thousands of US$), while popit and popjt refer to the coun-
tries’ population (in millions of inhabitants).
In the international market for arms, a formal obstacle to trade is represented by in-
ternational embargoes, which are relatively frequent and whose effectiveness is highly
controversial. There are several types of embargo: international organizations such
as the UN, the OECD or the EU impose mandatory or non-mandatory embargoes,
and some countries also initiate unilateral export restrictions. I restrict my attention
to UN mandatory arms embargoes and retrieve my information combining UN secre-
tariat sources and the dataset on international arms embargoes provided by SIPRI: the
dummy embargojt equals one if the importer country is under a UN mandatory arms
embargo regime at time t.
Since geographical and cultural factors correlate with trade, I control for distanceij
which refers to the average distance between the two countries in thousands of kilo-
meters (Gledistch and Ward, 2001). Trade exchanges lead to a diplomatic familiarity
and an economic interdependence that may facilitate MCW transfers, and therefore
I include total tradeijt representing trade flows between the two countries expressed
in billions of US$. These data come from the Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset de-
scribed in Gledistch (2002).
10The fourth category of extra-systemic armed conflict (which occurs between a state and a non-
state group outside its own territory) is omitted for having too few positive observations.
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All democratic MCW exporters proclaim an ideological concern for human rights
and a firm rejection of their abuse. Thus in some specification I also explicitly control
for the level of human right violations in the importer country. Data come from the
Political Terror Scale dataset (2008) that measures states’ human rights record from
Amnesty International and the US State Department. I choose the score derived from
Amnesty International reports: human rightsjt represents human rights violations in
act in the importer country on a five-point interval scale, where a higher score indicates
more severe violations.
Descriptive statistics are reported in tables 1 and 2.
4 Results
4.1 Democracies vs. Autocracies
Since my goal is to study the impact of politics on arms exports, I set a first distinction
based on the nature of the political regime: whether it is democratic or autocratic. In
fact democracies and autocracies may weigh economic and political incentives differ-
ently. Moreover, since trade liberalization does not apply to autocratic regimes, there
is no a priori reason why left and right autocracies should differ with respect to arms
exporting policy. In what follows I provide evidence that democracies and autocracies
differ in their MCW exporting behavior.
The results presented in Table 3 are based on the full sample of twenty exporters,
where democracies which are 87% of the sample account for about 65% of total MCW
exports. All results refer to a fixed-effects gravity-type TOBIT where the dependent
variable is armsijt. In column (1) a specification with no interactions is presented.
The dummy democracyit captures disparities in overall MCW exporting behavior. In
addition to the baseline characteristics (per capita GDP and population of exporter
and importer), I control for embargoes and conflicts in the importer country, ad for a
dummy expressing the same political orientation. A dummy post Cold Wart, which
takes value one for years 1990 onwards, is there to capture the sudden worldwide
demilitarization which brought a reduction of 40% in military expenditure and inter-
national arms transfers (See Skons, 2000; Dunne et al., 2003). post Cold Wart and
10
same orientationijt are also and interacted, in order to take into account the changes
in the international scenario: during the Cold War political orientation also reflected
bloc division, while after 1989 a major political break and a simultaneous MCW market
restructuring took place. In column (2) all regressors of column (1) are interacted with
the dummy democracyit. This is a straightforward test to check whether democracies
and autocracies differ in any of the previous dimensions.
Results suggest that, once we account for country-specific effects, democracies tend
to export more MCW. Also, the interaction terms in column (2) are significant. Ex-
porter’s per capita GDP is always positively correlated with MCW exports, but for
democracies the effect is much smaller. In contrast, exporter’s population is positive for
autocracies, but negative for democracies. For what concerns importer’s characteristics
pgdpjt and popjt, democracies tend to export MCW to rich countries while autocracies
tend to export to poor countries, and importer’s population has much more (positive)
impact on democracies. Since population and GDP proxy for importer’s willingness
to pay, this can be interpreted as democratic exporters being more sensitive to pure
economic incentives. Embargo policies seem to impact autocracies’ exports only. In
case of an interstate armed conflict (type A) autocracies tend to export MCW while
democracies tend not to. When the conflict is internal (type B) the coefficient is
positive and the interaction term is not significant, while in case of internationalized
internal conflicts (type C) both types of regime tend to decrease MCW exports, but
the negative effect is more modest for democracies. The fact that importer and ex-
porter share the same political orientation (both left-wing, or right-wing, or centrist)
always has a positive effect, which as expected decreases in magnitude after the Cold
War. However, this effect is very little for democracies and much bigger for autocracies.
The post Cold Wart dummy reconfirms the sudden drop in MCW exports after 1989
(Figure 1) and its interaction with democracyit suggests that the drop was more at the
expenses of democracies, who were set on an higher export level before.
4.2 The Political Conditions of Democratic Exporters
The previous subsection has shown how democracies and autocracies differ with re-
spect to MCW exporting behavior. I now restrict my attention to the sub sample
of democratic exporters (excluding USSR, Czechoslovakia, China, Poland 1950-1988,
Brazil 1964-1984) and explore how internal political conditions impact MCW export
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policies.
Results in Table 4 still refer to a fixed-effects gravity-type panel TOBIT where the
dependent variable armsijt is the amount of MCW transferred in a given year. Column
(1) contains the baseline specification which covers the entire period 1975-2004. The
regressors included are: exporter’s political variables (whether the executive is centrist
or left-wing, the concentration index Herfindahlit, and two dummies equal to one if
the government is serving the last year of the current term with or without immediate
re-election respectively), per capita GDP and population of exporter and importer,
embargoes and conflicts in act in the importer country, a dummy for the same political
orientation (both left-wing, or right-wing, or centrist), and a dummy for the post Cold
War period interacted with same orientationijt to capture bloc division.
In columns (2) and (3) the regressors are the same as in the baseline, but the ex-
porters’ sample is restricted. In column (2) only strongly democratic exporters (polity
indicator of 6 and above) are considered. In column (3) I exclude the US (which has
always ranked first in MCW exports from the 1950’s onwards and which still nowadays
exports the majority of the world’s weapons).
In column (4) I add trade-related controls: the exporter-specific trend in arms out-
flows MCW exportsit, the distance between the two countries, and the value of the
bilateral generic trade flows in that given year. Due to data availability, this specifica-
tion restricts the time span to 1975-2000.
All democracies proclaim an ideological concern for human rights and democratic
governance. In line with previous studies (Blanton, 2000) column (5) controls for the
democracy score (in a scale from -10 to +10) and human rights violations in the im-
porting country. I also interact the importer’s democracy score with the post Cold
War dummy: during Cold War the countries in the Eastern bloc were classified as
non-democratic, so in principle democracies’ reluctance to export to non-democratic
countries might have been just due to the fact that many of those countries were part
of the Eastern bloc.
Results in Table 4 are consistent across specifications and political variables show
interesting patterns. The exporter’s chief executive being right-wing has a positive and
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significant impact on MCW exports. This may reflect a general right-wing tendency
to lower trade barriers, with its consequences on deregularization of heavy industry
exports, or a greater importance of national industry in political agenda, resulting in
a higher economic support toward heavy armament sector. With the information we
have, there is no way to disentangle those various mechanisms. The concentration
index Herfindahlit is negative and significant: high political competition seem to be
associated with high MCW exports. For what concerns the end of the executive’s cur-
rent term, results are particularly neat: if there is no specific rule limiting re-election
(end termit equals one) the coefficient is negative and significant. That is, democratic
executives decrease their MCW export when running the campaign for re-election. In-
stead, if the executive cannot be immediately re-elected (end last termit equals one)
the coefficient is significantly positive and bigger in magnitude: when the mandate is
expiring MCW exports increase significantly. This evidence is interesting but hardly
surprising, as the public scrutiny of democratic voters is sensitive to arms-related ar-
guments.
All other results go in the expected direction. The exporter having a higher per
capita GDP and being less populous increases the quantity of MCW traded, as in Ta-
ble 3. On the other side, per capita GDP and population of the importer, which may
proxy for its likelihood to pay in the MCW open market, are positively significant.
UN embargoes pending on the importer country are negative, but only significant in
three out of five specifications, in line with the high rate of non-compliance reported
by anecdotic and official sources (Amnesty International, IANSA, and Oxfam Inter-
national, 2006). For what concerns the conflicts in the importer country, internal
conflicts (type B) and internal internationalized conflicts (type C) are positive and sig-
nificant. The only exception is the negative sign of internal internationalized conflicts
for highly democratic exporters (column 2). Interstate conflicts (type A) are always
negative, but only occasionally significant. The dummy post Cold Wart is negative it-
self (apart a small positive effect for the highly democratic exporters), consistently with
the general crisis in the industry that led to a reduction of 40% in military expenditure
and international arms transfers (Skons, 2000; Dunne et al., 2003). The coefficient of
same orientationijt is positive and significant, but the negatively-signed interaction
with the post Cold War dummy more than compensates the main effect: after the
Cold War there is no more space for strategic considerations of political friendships. In
column (4) not surprisingly we find that the distance between countries is negatively
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significant and that bilateral trade flows are positively significant. Exporters’ market
trends MCW exportsit appear negative, which is compatible with the low flexibility of
heavy industry supply. For what regards column (5), only the importer’s democracy
score seems positively significant, while its interaction with the post Cold War dummy
is not. Also importer’s human rights violations seem not to affect MCW trade.
5 Conclusions
All through the XXth century arms have been not only tradable goods, but also for-
eign policy instruments. Politics can influence arms trade through several channels:
regulation is country’s sovereignty, export licenses are exclusively granted by govern-
mental agencies, a relevant share of the armament industry is state property, and the
arms production sector attracts subsidies and other measures in defense of national
industry. This paper focuses on major conventional weapons (MCW) and investigates
whether exporter’s internal political conditions impact the quantity of MCW supplied
to third countries. For this purpose, a gravity-type TOBIT equation is estimated for
years 1975-2004. Results suggest that the determinants of MCW supply for autocratic
and democratic regimes differ. For what concerns democracies, the government in
power being right-wing significantly increases the quantity of MCW exported. This
may reflect a general right-wing tendency to deregulate trade, or a greater support
toward the national armament sector. I also find that lower political competition in
the parliament (as expressed by the Herfindahl index) associates with lower MCW
exports. Finally, data suggests that arms trade is particularly affected during the elec-
toral campaign: democratic executives serving the last year of their current term tend
to increase MCW exports if they cannot be immediately re-elected, and to decrease
MCW exports if they can run for re-election. The contribution of the paper is to use
longitudinally comparative data and a sound quantitative framework to shed light on
the political determinants of arms trade along the XXth century. The trade in arms is
a debated topic involving political institutions, ethic and economic considerations: a
better understanding of its mechanisms is necessary to design an efficient regulation,
and this paper is hopefully a step in this direction.
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Appendix A
Figure 1: Trends in MCW flows, 1975-2004
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, All Exporters
variable N mean min max sd
armsijt 38069 9.93 0 2979 80.94
democracyit 38069 0.87 0 1 0.33
pgdpit 38069 14.44 0.23 39.54 8.44
popit 38069 136.78 3.35 1294.85 282.96
pgdpjt 38069 7.30 0.20 54.29 7.59
popjt 38069 40.62 0.09 1294.85 144.68
embargojt 38069 0.01 0 1 0.09
conflict Ajt 38069 0.02 0 1 0.13
conflict Bjt 38069 0.11 0 1 0.31
conflict Cjt 38069 0.02 0 1 0.15
same orientationijt 38069 0.42 0 1 0.49
post Cold Wart 38069 0.55 0 1 0.50
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Democratic Exporters
variable N mean min max sd
armsijt 33066 10.81 0 2979 84.16
centristit 33066 0.10 0 1 0.30
leftit 33066 0.49 0 1 0.50
Herfindahlit 33066 0.32 0 1 0.12
end termit 33066 0.18 0 1 0.39
end last termit 33066 0.01 0 1 0.08
pgdpit 33066 16.15 4.39 39.54 7.67
popit 33066 60.47 3.35 295.41 69.53
pgdpjt 33066 7.48 0.20 54.29 7.72
popjt 33066 41.63 0.09 1294.85 148.66
embargojt 33066 0.01 0 1 0.09
conflict Ajt 33066 0.02 0 1 0.13
conflict Bjt 33066 0.11 0 1 0.31
conflict Cjt 33066 0.02 0 1 0.15
same orientationijt 33066 0.41 0 1 0.49
post Cold Wart 33066 0.58 0 1 0.49
MCW exportsit 33066 1.48 0 16.01 3.03
distanceij 33066 6.77 0.08 19.84 4.14
total tradeijt 28219 2.47 0 415.26 12.39
democracy scorejt 29179 3.94 -9 10 6.94
human rightsjt 21694 2.52 1 5 1.10
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Table 3: Results, All Exporters
(1) (2)
democracyit 18.259*** 141.065***
(1.970) (2.145)
pgdpit 0.654*** 24.094***
(0.101) (0.114)
democracyit ∗ pgdpit -19.567***
(0.112)
popit -0.222*** 0.380***
(0.005) (0.005)
democracyit ∗ popit -1.503***
(0.014)
pgdpjt 6.305*** -40.222***
(0.118) (0.135)
democracyit ∗ pgdpjt 46.349***
(0.134)
popjt 0.636*** 0.376***
(0.004) (0.005)
democracyit ∗ popjt 0.249***
(0.005)
embargojt -12.564** -197.989***
(5.023) (8.815)
democracyit ∗ embargojt 197.976***
(8.831)
conflict Ajt 0.202 67.504***
(2.875) (4.481)
democracyit ∗ conflict Ajt -78.365***
(5.075)
conflict Bjt 48.641*** 47.160***
(2.207) (3.120)
democracyit ∗ conflict Bjt -4.385
(3.179)
conflict Cjt -43.765*** -76.764***
(5.946) (10.312)
democracyit ∗ conflict Cjt 46.807***
(10.297)
(to be continued)
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Table 3: Results, All Exporters (continued)
(1) (2)
same orientationijt 39.565*** 180.998***
(1.701) (2.068)
democracyit ∗ same orientationijt -158.420***
(2.070)
post Cold Wart -47.314*** -64.416***
(2.325) (2.535)
democracyit ∗ post Cold Wart -26.519***
(2.514)
same orientationijt ∗ post Cold Wart -28.682*** -27.526***
(2.091) (2.305)
Fixed effects for: i; j; t YES YES
Constant -1970.405*** -1974.161***
(2.077) (2.159)
Sigma 233.429*** 229.819***
(0.654) (0.630)
Observations 38069 38069
Years 1975-2004 1975-2004
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Results, Democratic Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
centristit -13.876*** -11.061*** -18.636*** -27.058*** -15.232***
(2.227) (1.135) (2.274) (2.320) (3.116)
leftit -4.191** -1.977** -4.115** -8.150*** -11.471***
(1.673) (0.911) (1.672) (1.933) (2.687)
Herfindahlit -114.511*** -81.681*** -92.647*** -163.170*** -121.064***
(5.485) (3.025) (5.513) (6.259) (8.709)
end termit -13.187*** -7.996*** -13.023*** -13.010*** -13.140***
(1.664) (0.857) (1.668) (1.849) (2.440)
end last termit 93.826*** 35.095*** 87.163*** 83.103*** 93.567***
(3.174) (1.636) (3.212) (3.039) (3.616)
pgdpit 5.677*** -1.417*** 7.070*** 3.740*** 6.371***
(0.109) (0.061) (0.109) (0.142) (0.181)
popit -0.955*** -4.532*** -1.122*** -0.283*** 0.172***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026)
pgdpjt 5.332*** 3.402*** 5.348*** 5.139*** 5.980***
(0.122) (0.063) (0.122) (0.172) (0.245)
popjt 0.640*** 0.252*** 0.635*** 0.722*** 0.750***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
embargojt -3.510 -7.610*** -3.356 -22.949*** -16.482**
(5.169) (2.471) (5.174) (5.547) (6.645)
conflict Ajt -3.297 -2.348 -2.104 -6.458** -9.807***
(2.634) (1.536) (2.644) (2.904) (3.525)
conflict Bjt 43.545*** 31.435*** 43.307*** 45.339*** 30.435***
(2.283) (1.091) (2.285) (2.441) (3.172)
conflict Cjt 12.038** -6.582*** 11.897** 87.267*** 37.497***
(4.698) (2.179) (4.693) (8.353) (11.258)
same orientationijt 22.333*** 7.999*** 21.640*** 17.598*** 40.556***
(1.772) (0.937) (1.777) (2.004) (2.715)
post Cold Wart -98.374*** 14.631*** -117.732*** -102.309*** -123.937***
(2.351) (1.243) (2.357) (2.740) (3.596)
same orientationijt∗ -29.760*** -9.028*** -30.370*** -32.983*** -51.151***
post Cold Wart (2.092) (1.095) (2.099) (2.535) (3.211)
(to be continued)
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Table 4: Results, Democratic Exporters (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MCW exportsit -21.816*** -19.720***
(0.375) (0.556)
distanceij -1.021*** -2.641***
(0.252) (0.341)
total tradeijt 1.990*** 2.242***
(0.030) (0.040)
democracy scorejt 6.026***
(0.271)
post Cold Wart∗ -0.416
democracyjt (0.358)
human rightsjt -0.262
(0.936)
Fixed effects for: i; j; t YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1812.277*** -126.549*** -1795.075*** -1889.420*** -2117.776***
(2.165) (1.146) (2.169) (2.411) (3.237)
Sigma 224.475*** 104.912*** 224.451*** 225.674*** 240.327***
(0.618) (0.375) (0.617) (0.661) (0.845)
Observations 33066 30377 32780 28219 16987
Years 1975-2004 1975-2004 1975-2004 1975-2000 1980-2000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B
National Export Control Systems 11
CANADA
Legislation: Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) as amended. Licensing Au-
thority: Export Controls Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade (DFAIT). Consultation Procedures: different branches within DFAIT, the
Department of National Defense, Industry Canada and other agencies (such as the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) are
asked for specialist advice. End User Requirements:
in most cases one of the following will be required: International Import Certificate;
End-use Certificate or Import license; Delivery Verification Certificate; End-use State-
ment. Types of Licenses: most exports of military goods require a single ship-
ment/single consignee individual license. Some exports of military goods may take
place under a multiple shipment/single consignee individual license.
CHINA
Legislation: Decree of the State Council and the Central Military Commission of the
People’s Republic of China No. 234, 22 October 1997; Regulations of the People’s
Republic of China on the Administration of Arms Export, 1 January 1998. Licensing
Authority: State Administration of Arms Trade of the People’s Republic of China.
Consultation Procedures: items of arms export shall be examined and approved
by the State Administration of Arms Trade or by the State Administration of Arms
Trade jointly with the relevant departments under the State Council and the Central
Military Commission.
CZECH REPUBLIC
Legislation: Act No. 38/1994 of the Legal Code of 15 February 1994. Licensing Au-
thority: Ministry of Industry and Trade. Consultation Procedures: State Security
11Source: Sipri
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Office in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs can request information.
End User Requirements: an end user certificate and non-reexport clause should be
submitted as part of the license request. Licensing Negotiations: licenses should be
applied for after an applicant has received written intent from the buyer to conclude
a contract or an invitation to participate in a tender. Revocation Licenses: pos-
sible under conditions described in Act No. 38/1994. Types of Licenses: only an
individual license is used.
FRANCE
Legislation: Decree-law of 18 April 1939 creating a regime governing war material,
arms, and munitions; Decree no. 55-965 of 16 July 1955 reorganising the Interminis-
terial Committee for the S; Law no. 98-564 of 8 July 1998 with the intent of elimi-
nating antipersonnel mines. Licensing Authority: Interministerial Commission for
the Study of Export of War Material (CIEEMG). In the case of dual-use goods: the
Service des Titres du Commerce ExtE`rieur (SETICE). Consultation Procedures:
Autorization for the Exportation of War Material (AEMG) delivered by the Customs
general directorate. Possible inspection by the CIEEMG, composed, amongst others,
of representatives from the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Economy and Finance,
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. End User Requirements: not directly required.
License can be subject to a signed agreement undertaking not to reexport the controlled
item. License can also be subject to the proof that the controlled goods are delivered
to the authorized recipients. French authorities can request that the controlled item
not be reexported in the state in which it was purchased. This is usually relevant in the
sale of controlled components or sub-units. Licensing Negotiations: all stages of the
contract are controlled, as well as pre-shipment activities. Prospecting, negotiation,
and sale require an authorization. Authorizations, when granted, last for one year and
can be extended to three years if agreed to by the CIEEMG . Licensing Exemptions:
certain exemptions exist for transfer of certain classes of weapons within the European
Community and some material depending on its nature and destination e.g. temporary
exports, exports made by the Minister of National Defense. Revocation Licenses:
possible at any time. Types of Licenses: licenses are usually individual and apply
to one exporter for one group of goods and toward one destination. Licenses last for
one year.
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GERMANY
Legislation: War Weapons Control Act, implementing Article 26(2) of the Basic Law;
War Weapons Reporting Ordinance of 24 January 1995 (as amended); Foreign Trade
and Payments Act of 28 April 1961 (as amended); Foreign Trade and Payments Ordi-
nance of 18 December 1986 (as amended). Licensing Authority: Federal Ministry
for Economics in cases of war weapons. In cases of export of other military equip-
ment, the Federal Export Office (an agency of the Federal Ministry of Economics).
Consultation Procedures: Federal Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defence and with
other Ministries if appropriate. End User Requirements: an end user document
must normally be submitted with the application. There are three types of end user
certificate: an official EUC (for government end users); a private EUC (for company
or private end users) and an International Import Certificate (IIC). Licensing Ne-
gotiations: no authorization required for negotiating a contract; a special license is
required for deals by intermediaries regarding the procurement of war weapons which
are located abroad and are to be delivered to the foreign customer without encounter-
ing German territory. Licensing Exemptions: in certain cases, such as insignificant
parts of firearms, military equipment can be exported under a general license. Revo-
cation Licenses: possible only under narrow legal conditions such as a false statement
in a license application. Types of Licenses: there is no distinction between licenses
based on destination; exports within the framework of an intergovernmental coopera-
tion project are covered by a general license.
ITALY
Legislation: Law No. 185/90, 9 July 1990 (New Rules for the Control of Export,
Import and Transit of Conventional Weapons). Licensing Authority: Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Indus-
try, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Finance (Customs), Treasury. End User
Requirements: an end-user certificate is required for all destinations. However, the
certificate can take different forms depending on the destination. Import certificates
and delivery verification certificates are not verified if provided by the governmental
authorities of the importing countries. The end-user certificate also includes a no re-
export statement regarded as a contractual obligation between Italy and the importing
country. Licensing Negotiations: license applications are examined on a case by
case basis. Prior authorisation is required before a contract is signed. Licensing Ex-
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emptions: the 1990 Law No. 185/90 does not apply to the following: a) temporary
exports directly effected by, or on behalf of the Central Government, to implement
its own arms and equipment programmes for the armed forces and police; b) exports
or concessions between governments for the purposes of military aid, under the terms
of international agreements; c) the transit of armaments and equipment to meet the
needs of allied countries, as defined in the Convention on the Status of NATO Forces,
provided that waivers to Articles VI, XI, XII, XIII and XIV of the Convention between
the States signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty are not invoked for any reason
whatsoever. Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked at any time. Types of
Licenses: a national register of companies operating in the field of planning, manu-
facture, import, export, maintenance and servicing of military products is maintained.
Only companies in the register may receive permission to negotiate contracts for ex-
ports of military list items. Only individual licenses are used. Special conditions can
be attached to an individual license (normally valid for 1 year) on a case-by-case basis.
NETHERLANDS
Legislation: Import and Export Law (1962); Decree on the Export of Strategic Goods
(1963). Related laws and decrees: the Decree on the Delivery of Declaration of Strategic
Goods forms the basis for International Import Certificates (IIC’s) and Delivery Verifi-
cation Certificates; the Decree on Financial Transactions for Strategic Goods demands
that a license is required in each case a Dutch legal or natural person is financially
involved in the trade of strategic goods that are in transit or otherwise outside the
European Union; the Law Governing Economic Violations provides for the possibility
of sanctions in cases of breaches of the aforementioned regulations and sets the frame-
work for control and enforceability; the Sanctions Law provides for the possibility to
implement recommendations, resolutions or agreements of international organizations
(such as the UN) on international trade sanctions for military or other goods. Li-
censing Authority: applications for export licenses are submitted to the Import and
Export Licensing Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Export licenses are issued by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs on the basis of information contained in the contract, in
the International Import Certificate, and/or in the end-user statement. Consultation
Procedures: if the application involves inter alia military equipment which is also in
use by or specially developed and designed for the Dutch armed forces, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs consults with the Ministry of Defense on the possible classification
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aspects. Subsequently, the Minister for Foreign Affairs submits his advice, which plays
an essential role in the decision making process. If there are no objections with re-
gard to the proposed export, the export license is issued by the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. End User Requirements: in principle, all military shipments require an
International Import Certificate or an end-user certificate. Licensing Negotiations:
the formal application procedure requires the submission of a signed contract. There is
no official government authority required to enter into contract negotiations or to sign
contracts with foreign customers. Licensing Exemptions: no license is required for
exports to Belgium and Luxembourg. Revocation Licenses: the Import and Export
Law provides for two possibilities to revoke export licenses: if the information provided
by the licensee in order to receive the license appears to be inaccurate or incomplete; or
if there is a very urgent or serious reason, for example war or the threat of war. Types
of Licenses: there are two types of license: an individual license for a shipment to an
end-user in one country only, for one or for different kinds of goods (value and quantity
of the shipment have to be indicated at the time of application); a global license, which
is a more flexible means of licensing and allows multiple shipments of a range of goods
to several destinations (e.g. issued in case of a project in one or more countries).
NORWAY
Legislation: Law of 18 December 1987 no. 93 on Control over the Export of Strategic
Goods, Services and Technology; Ministry for Foreign Affairs Decree of 10 January
1989 to implement export regulations for strategic goods, services and technology.
Licensing Authority: Section for Export Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Con-
sultation Procedures: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs may consult the Ministry of
Defense in cases where an application to export has particularly important implications
to national defense or to participation in international defense industrial cooperation.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs may consult the Defense Research Institute within the
Ministry of Defense in cases where information is required on technical aspects of the
use of particular items. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs may consult the Ministry of
Economy in cases where an application to export has important implications for Norwe-
gian economic interests. End User Requirements: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
may require end-user statements in connection with the export of products included
in lists I and II and with the export of technology or provision of services in connec-
tion with all such products. Licensing Negotiations: no authorization required for
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seller/buyer negotiations. Licensing Exemptions: precursors to chemical weapons
if the substance in question makes up less than 10 percent of a mixture or forms a
normal component of consumer goods packaged for personal use, recovery and oil rig
equipment that is to be used in emergency assistance actions, arms that are cleared
by Customs with the authorization ”Declaration on temporary export of hunting or
sporting guns”, goods for use by the European Space Agency (ESA), goods, services
and technologies for use on the Norwegian part of the Continental Shelf, or on board
Norwegian ships under a Norwegian flag, and Norwegian aircraft during international
flights. Types of Licenses: for items on List I an individual license (authorizing a
specified shipment to a single, specified recipient) will be required. For items on List II
a general license may be available, usually when exports are to recipients in Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland or the United
States or when the recipient is located in a European Union member state. A general
license will be valid for 3 years.
POLAND
Legislation: Decision of Council of Ministers Regulation of 14 September 1999 ”On
prohibition and limitation in foreign special trade”; Law of 29 November 2000 con-
cerning international trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic significance
for state security and maintenance of international peace and security, and amending
selected laws. Licensing Authority: Ministry of Economy, Department of Export
Control. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the State Protection Of-
fice. End User Requirements: it is necessary to provide an end-user certificate for
each export contract with a proper non-re-export clause to avoid risk of transfers to
states subject to UN embargoes, EU restrictions or accused of supporting terrorism
(as a minimum a ban on the reexport of commodities to the states which are sub-
ject to UN embargoes). Licensing Negotiations: the Ministry of Economy should
be informed about negotiations and intent to offer controlled items but no license is
required. Licensing Exemptions: export of arms always requires a permit. Revo-
cation Licenses: export permits may be canceled in cases where a company breaks
the law and when the transfer causes threat to the national interest, state security or
national foreign policy goals. Types of Licenses: general licenses are used for export
controls applied to dual-use goods. For conventional arms an individual license is used.
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Individual license: always required (including by those companies that do not require
a general license) to carry out a particular transaction (issued on a case-by-case basis).
These may be of four kinds: to enter into negotiations and provide an offer; to carry
out export and/or import; to carry out re-export; to carry out transit.
RUSSIA
Legislation: Federal law of the Russian Federation on Military-Technical Coopera-
tion of the Russian Federation With Foreign States, adopted by the State Duma on 3
July 1998 and approved by the Federation Council on 9 July 1998; Russian Federation
Presidential Decree No 1953, ”to form the Russian Federation Committee for Military-
Technical Cooperation with Foreign States”, 1 December 2000. Licensing Authority:
Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation With Foreign States. Consultation
Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Economics, State Customs Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal
Security Service. End User Requirements: federal executive institutions of the
Russian Federation shall supervise deliveries of military products intended for transfer
to foreign clients. Executive institutions monitor the development, manufacture and
delivery of military products according to the procedure determined by the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation. Licensing Negotiations: marketing and contract
negotiations require authorization from the Committee for Military-Technical Coop-
eration With Foreign States. Revocation Licenses: organizations and enterprises
require authorization to take part in military-technical cooperation with foreign states.
This authorization is subject to review by the Committee for Military-Technical Co-
operation With Foreign States and can be withdrawn by that Committee.
SPAIN
Legislation: Royal Decree No. 491/1998 of 12 March 1998. Licensing Authority:
Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on Foreign Trade in Defense or Dual-Use Material
(JIMDDU) within the Ministry of Economy and Taxes. The Under-Director-General
for Foreign Trade of Defense and Dual-Use Material at the Ministry of Economy and
Taxes provides a secretariat for the Board. JIMDDU is chaired by the Secretary of
State for Trade, Tourism and Small and Medium Enterprises. The Deputy Chair
is Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consultation Procedures:
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represented on the Inter-Ministerial Regulatory Board on Foreign Trade in Defense
or Dual-Use Material are the Ministries of Trade, Tourism and Small and Medium
Enterprises, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, the Ministry of
Industry and Energy. End User Requirements: an end-user certificate issued by
a government agency in the importing state is required for exports of war material.
For other materials that are for military use an end-user certificate may be issued by
a company. If there are doubts about the final destination additional controls may
be applied. Licensing Negotiations: no authorization is needed to negotiate or
sign a contract. Licensing Exemptions: none. Revocation Licenses: licenses
can be revoked: when the export might threaten peace or stability on a regional or
global level; when the export contravenes Spain’s international commitments; when
the export threatens Spain’s national defense or foreign policy interests. Types of
Licenses: Individual licenses valid for 6 months are used for war material exports.
SWEDEN
Legislation: Military Equipment Act (1992); Military Equipment Ordinance (1992).
Licensing Authority: The National Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP), which
is obliged to submit cases of principal significance or cases which are otherwise im-
portant to the Government. Consultation Procedures: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Defense. End User Requirements: in principle required for all exports.
Licensing Exemptions: a private person may take small arms and ammunition out
of the country for his personal use if entitled under the Weapons Act (1973). Revo-
cation Licenses: a license may be revoked. Types of Licenses: only one type of
license used.
SWITZERLAND
Legislation: Article 41 and article 64 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confed-
eration of 29 May 1874 (as amended); Federal Law on War Material of 13 December
1996; Federal Law on the control of dual use goods and specific military goods of
13 December 1996; Ordinance on the exportation, importation, and transit of dual
use goods and specific military goods of 25 June 1997; Ordinance on War Material
of 25 February 1998. Licensing Authority: designated by the Federal Council, the
Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs (OFAEE, Office FE`dE`ral des Affaires
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Economiques ExtE`rieures) is authorized to issue licenses (art. 13 of ordinance of 25
February 1998). Consultation Procedures: procedures are established in art. 14
of ordinance of 25 February 1998 and are as follows: 1the OFAEE issues authoriza-
tions for further marketing authorizations in tandem with the Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the OFAEE consults the relevant branch of the Federal
Department of Defense, of Civil Protection, and Sports (DDPS) if political security or
armament interests are in question. It consults the Federal Office of Energy (OFEN)
if nuclear issues are present; 3) the relevant services decide whether requests are of
major importance regarding foreign or security policy and thus must be submitted to
the Federal Council; 4) if the relevant services cannot agree on the proper treatment
of the requests the latter are submitted the Federal Council; 5) in cases of minor im-
portance or if there are precedents, the relevant authorities can authorize the OFAEE
to take decisions. End User Requirements: Art. 18 of law of 13 December stipu-
lates that export authorizations are usually only issued for goods destined to foreign
governments or companies working for foreign governments, and a declaration that the
goods will not be reexported. The clause may not be required for parts destined to
be integrated (and are integrated) and then exported or for anonymous parts of neg-
ligible value. Licensing Negotiations: initial authorization required for commercial
activity including the process of offering, acquiring, and transferring. Brokerage and
transfer of intellectual property also subject to authorization (art. 6 ,9, and 20 of law
of 13 December 1996). Licensing Exemptions: the licensing scheme is not applica-
ble to armament companies when their activities are related to acquisition of material
for the Swiss army (art. 4 of law of 13 December).Temporary export of weapons by
persons participating in firing competitions or training are exempt (art 9 of ordinance
of 25 February 1998). Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked or suspended in
exceptional circumstances (art.19 of law of 13 December 1998). Types of Licenses:
Six types of authorization: manufacture, brokerage, importation, exportation, transit
and intellectual property (art. 12 of law of 13 December 1996). Import, export, and
transit licenses last 12 months and can be extended by six months (art. 15 of ordinance
of 25 February 1998).
UK
Legislation: Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 (as amended). Export Control
Act 2002. Licensing Authority: Department of Trade and Industry. Consultation
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Procedures: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, Department
for International Development. End User Requirements: provision of end-user cer-
tificate including obligation not to re-export needed. Licensing Negotiations: no
authorization needed for negotiating contracts unless classified information has to be
released. Licensing Exemptions: government to government transfers; companies
acting on behalf of their governments: exemption on the grounds of Crown Status;
government to government collaborative projects. Revocation Licenses: the Secre-
tary of State for Trade and Industry may revoke export licenses at any time and for
any reason.
USA
Legislation: Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended). Licensing Authority:
Department of State. Consultation Procedures: The Department of State seeks
the views of the Department of Defense and other relevant specialist agencies (such
as the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA)) in around 30% of license
cases. End User Requirements: a Non-Transfer and Use Certificate is required
as a condition to the approval of any license or agreement that relates to significant
military equipment, classified articles or classified technical data. Written approval of
the Office of Defense Trade Controls must be obtained before reselling, transferring,
transshipping or disposing of a defense article to any end user, end use or destination
other than that stated in the export license. Licensing Negotiations: a marketing
license is required for contacts with potential customers if information or technical data
covered by the US Munitions List is revealed in the course of the contact. Revocation
Licenses: licenses can be revoked at the discretion of the President and the Secretary
of State under a wide range of circumstances. Types of Licenses: there are 4 types of
document that can authorize exports of controlled items: 1) export licenses: Documents
that permit the temporary or permanent export of items on the US Munitions List;
2) technical assistance agreements: a contract for the delivery of a defense service or
disclosure of technical data; 3) manufacturing licenses: a document whereby a US legal
person grants a foreign person authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad;
4) distribution agreements: a contract to establish a warehouse or distribution point
abroad for defense articles exported from the US for subsequent distribution to entities
in an approved sales territory.
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UKRAINE
Legislation: Law on State Control of international Transfers of Goods Designated
for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods, 20 February, 2003; Decree no. 117/98
of the President of Ukraine, 13 February 1998; Decree no. 422/99 of the President
of Ukraine, 21 April 1999; Decree no. 423/97 of the President of Ukraine, 13 May
1997; Provisions approved by Decree no. 1005 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine,
22 June 1996; Provisions approved by Decree no. 125 of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine, 4 February 1997 with changes according to Decree no. 1042 by the Cabinet
of Ministers 15 June 1999; Provisions approved by Decree no. 1358 by the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, 8 December 1997; Decree no. 1228 of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine, 12 July 1999;Decree no. 473 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 10
March 2000. Licensing Authority: State Service on Export Control. Consultation
Procedures: the Commission on Export Control Policy and Military and Technical
Cooperation with Foreign Countries, which is now under the authority of the Presi-
dential Administration. End User Requirements: decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Licensing Negotiations: an exporter requires permission from the State Service on
Export Control to begin contract negotiations with a foreign customer. Licensing
Exemptions: none. Revocation Licenses: licenses can be revoked or suspended if:
there are reasons to believe that the end-use of the items run counter to the information
contained in the license application; the exporter becomes bankrupt or ceases to exist;
the terms of the contract with the foreign partner that was the basis for the license
application was altered after the license was issued; or if the transfer violates Ukraine’s
international obligations. Types of Licenses: general and individual licenses are
available.
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